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For the purposes of his essay, Professor Bondy takes for granted that “the epistemic 
approach to the theory of argument is reasonable” (p. 2). But what does that 
approach involve, and more particularly, what, according to it, is the aim of 
argumentation? Well, to answer that question we might first ask what the epistemic 
aim of belief is. Is it to hold true beliefs and to avoid holding false ones (cf., p. 1)? But 
what does that mean since these two aims may conflict? Is the aim to have a high 
ratio of true to false beliefs? That does not seem right, for as Bondy points out, that 
goal could be satisfied by holding only obviously true beliefs, say, for each of us that 
we exist or that 1 + 1 = 2 (p. 3). Maybe it is holding many true beliefs. But that does 
not seem right either, for we could do that by memorizing the phone numbers of 
people in the phone book, or by believing lots of trivial mathematical truths (such 
as: 1/4 is 1/2 of 1/2 ; 1/8 is 1/2 of 1/4, and so on). Maybe it is having many true 
beliefs about a broad range of subjects, as Bondy suggests (p. 3). Even that does not 
seem right for I might hold lots of trivial beliefs on a wide range of subjects (phone 
books, math, the number of grass blades in town squares across the country, the 
number of grains of sand in sandboxes across the country, etc.). I think the proper 
epistemic aim for every person is to believe P if and only if P is true for any 
proposition, P, that he considers. Whether the proposition is important or trivial is 
of pragmatic, but not epistemic, concern. I think the same goes for the question of 
whether someone holds many true beliefs or only a few, or a wide, or only a narrow, 
range of beliefs. 
 While I think this is the proper epistemic aim of belief and also of argument, I 
don’t think a good argument is merely one that arrives at a true belief. The following 
argument is not a good one: 
 
(1)  Windsor has a population larger than Toronto’s. 
(2)  I will live to the age of 200. 
(3)  Therefore, Obama is currently the President of the United 
States. 
 
even though it has a true conclusion. 
 A good argument need not achieve the relevant aim of argumentation. The 
epistemic view of what constitutes a good argument should hold that the aim of a 
good argument is a true belief supported by true premises, but that what makes the 
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argument good is the responsible pursuit of that aim. Bondy is himself a 
responsibilist about argumentation (p. 5). But he thinks that we are being 
epistemically responsible in holding a belief if “we are doing the best we can” in 
acquiring that belief (p. 4). However, if we suffer from some defect that causes us to 
weigh the evidence incorrectly, then we can be doing the best we can in acquiring 
some belief, be epistemically blameless in holding that belief, and yet not be justified 
in holding it. To be justified in holding some belief, that belief must fit the evidence. 
The evidence the person actually possesses? Not necessarily, for the person may 
have been negligent in failing to gather more evidence before forming her belief, and 
this could affect whether she is justified in believing what she does. Justification 
requires the person to fit her beliefs to the evidence she should possess. 
 So what is it, on the epistemic view, to be responsible in argumentation? 
Bondy says that, “...responsible engagement in argument involves accepting the 
conclusion on the basis of the premises when (and only when) the premises give the 
arguers good reason for thinking the conclusion is true.” (p. 5; my italics). On this 
account, a person can be responsible in argumentation even if the premises do not 
really support the conclusion, provided she has reason to believe they do (and is 
justified in accepting the premises). So, for instance, a person could be responsible 
in her argumentation if the argument she gives contains a subtle equivocation that 
she does not notice. In that case, she will have good reason to believe that the 
justified premises support the conclusion because they seem to. 
 However, Bondy gives a second slightly different account of a responsible 
argument according to which the argument is a good one, “...when and only when 
the premises provide good reason for thinking that the conclusion is true.” (p. 6; my 
italics). On this account, it might be argued that an argument that contains a subtle 
equivocation is not a good argument because the premises do not give the arguer 
good reason to believe that the conclusion is true. They would do that only if they 
really did support the conclusion. 
  I do not offer these observations as criticisms of Bondy’s account of 
responsible argumentation or of what it is to be a good argument. I think there may 
be two senses of “good argument” on the epistemic approach alone, and the subtly 
different accounts Bondy gives capture these two different senses. 
 For Bondy, to be an epistemically virtuous arguer is to be disposed to give 
responsible arguments. As he says, for him the primary focus is on what it is for an 
argument to be a responsible one, with the secondary focus being on what it is to be 
a good arguer. He is not really a virtue theorist who holds that a good argument is 
what a good arguer would produce, or at least tend to produce. For him, a good 
argument is a responsible argument and a virtuous arguer is someone disposed to 
give responsible arguments. 
 What traits does Bondy think make one a virtuous arguer? He says that being 
communicative is one such trait (p. 6). A communicative person is one who is 
disposed to share his reasons for his beliefs with others, which will enable him to 
receive critical feedback, which constitutes further evidence for or against his belief. 
However, gathering further evidence may not be necessary for the person to have a 
justified belief. Maybe Bondy thinks that it is a good thing to have a stable belief and 
that stability will be increased with increased evidence. 
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 He also lists sensitivity to detail as another virtue of arguers (p. 6). The idea is 
that if a person were not sensitive to detail he may not be sensitive to important, but 
subtle, differences that affect justification. For instance, if a person cannot 
distinguish crows from ravens, he might conclude something about “big black birds 
that caw” that only applies to, say, ravens, not crows. Sensitivity to detail allows a 
person to see that certain evidence is pertinent to some claim but not to others. 
 To sum up, just as the proper epistemic aim for belief is to believe a 
proposition if and only if it’s true, the proper aim of argumentation is to have an 
argument with true premises that really do support the conclusion. However, a 
subject can be justified in believing a proposition provided her belief fits the 
evidence that she should have, even if the belief is not true. Similarly, an arguer can 
be responsible in accepting the conclusion of some argument if she is justified in 
believing its premises and there is reason to think that these premises support the 
conclusion, even if the conclusion is false.  
 A responsible argument provides justification for believing its conclusion. 
Bondy and I may disagree on some of the details, but we are essentially in 
agreement about the nature of responsible argumentation and on the nature of a 
virtuous arguer, namely, someone disposed to give and to recognize responsible 
arguments. 
